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The world problem: on the computability of the
topology of 4-manifolds
J R van Meter
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD 20771
Abstract. Topological classification of the 4-manifolds bridges computation theory
and physics. A proof of the undecidability of the homeomorphy problem for 4-
manifolds is outlined here in a clarifying way. It is shown that an arbitrary Turing
machine with an arbitrary input can be encoded into the topology of a 4-manifold,
such that the 4-manifold is homeomorphic to a certain other 4-manifold if and only if
the corresponding Turing machine halts on the associated input. Physical implications
are briefly discussed.
PACS numbers: 0210-v, 0240Re, 0420Gz
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1. Introduction
A theorem proved by Markov on the non-classifiability of the 4-manifolds implies
that, given some comprehensive specification for the topology of a manifold (such as
its triangulation, a la Regge calculus, or instructions for constructing it via cutting
and gluing simpler spaces) there exists no general algorithm to decide whether the
manifold is homeomorphic to some other manifold [1]. The impossibility of classifying
the 4-manifolds is a well-known topological result, the proof of which, however, may
not be well known in the physics community. It is potentially a result of profound
physical implications, as the universe certainly appears to be a manifold of at least
four dimensions. The burgeoning quest for the topology of the universe [2] is still in
its infancy; Markov’s theorem may ultimately bear upon what can be deduced about
it. Already Markov’s theorem impacts certain approaches to quantum gravity. On
the basis of this theorem, and consideration of hypothetical quantum superpositions
of manifolds, Penrose has heuristically argued that the universe is fundamentally non-
computable [3]. As another example, in analogy with Feynman’s sum over histories
approach to quantum mechanics, the Euclidean path integral approach to quantum
gravity requires a sum over all possible topologies, with appropriate weighting, in order
to calculate expectation values. However, Markov’s theorem implies inherent difficulties
in computing such a summation, as it would be impossible to decide whether a particular
topology had been counted more than once [4].
Owing to its theorized physical significance, the computability and tractability of
this sum over topologies has received some attention in the literature. Although direct
summation of the series is non-computable, it is unknown whether it might nonetheless
be deducible by indirect means, perhaps as the computable limit of some sequence;
failing in that, it has been implied that the sum can nevertheless be approximated
to any desired order of accuracy [4]. However, without a systematic way to proceed,
there is no guarantee that such an approximation could be carried through in finite
time. To obviate such difficulty, it has been proposed to relax the condition of
homeomorphy, when classifying the manifolds, and instead classify them according to
a weaker condition, in terms of their triangulation [5, 6]. But such a classification
scheme would keep infinite redundancy of physically distinct manifolds in the series and
it is not clear how to interpret the resulting sum. More recently, partly sidestepping
the issue of computability, deductions have been made about the density of topologies
per “normalized volume” – a geometric quantity – in the context of a saddle-point
approximation to the Euclidean path integral [7, 8, 9]. The above work was motivated
by the tantalizing possibility that this sum over topologies might determine the value
of the cosmological constant [7, 8, 9, 10].
Manifold non-classifiability represents a fascinating juxtaposition of theoretical
computer science with physics. The intent here is to outline a proof that will establish a
correspondence between Turing machines and 4-manifolds such that deciding whether a
manifold is homeomorphic to a certain other manifold is tantamount to deciding whether
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the corresponding Turing machine halts; to the author’s knowledge this illuminating
point has not been explicitly made elsewhere. It is further hoped that the proof sketched
here will provide insight into the physical relevance of Markov’s theorem.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, Turing machines, and the
unsolvability of the halting problem, are reviewed. In Section 3 it is shown that if the
group triviality problem could be solved then the halting problem could be solved. In
Section 4 it is shown that if the 4-manifold homeomorphy problem could be solved then
the group triviality problem could be solved. These results are discussed in Section 5.
2. Turing machines
A Turing machine is a formal idealization of a computer [11]. In its simplest formulation,
a Turing machine consists of a linear tape divided into squares onto which symbols have
been printed, and a movable head that scans each square one at a time. The sequence
of symbols initially printed on the tape can be considered the input of the Turing
machine. The head can overwrite the current scanned square, move one square to the
right, or move one square to the left, depending on its internal state and its programmed
instructions. Let the h + 1 possible states of the machine be denoted by q0, ...qh and
the k + 1 possible symbols printed on the tape be denoted by s0, ...sk. The instructions
followed by the machine can be conceived as a list of if-then statements of the form:
“if the current state is qi and the current scanned symbol is sj then [either move a
square or print a symbol] and change to state qk ”. After updating its state and its
current scanned symbol, the machine repeats the process, reviewing the list of if-then
statements. This goes on forever or until the machine arrives at a (qi, sj) pair for which it
has no instructions, at which point it halts. Note that, although more properly referred
to as a program, by convention the term “Turing machine” is taken to be synonymous
with its hardwired instructions.
Consider, as Turing did, machines designed to output a sequence of symbols,
potentially never ending, as the digits of a real number. Its output can be printed
on every other square of the tape, while the rest of the squares are reserved for “scratch
paper”. Rather than print the entire sequence continuously, these machines will print
only j digits, given the integer j as an input (i.e., initially printed on some of the tape
squares). All such machines, which input an integer and output a digit, can themselves
be ordered and numbered by integers. Turing provided a specific way to encode the
instructions which uniquely characterize each Turing machine into the digits of a (very
large) integer; these integers can then be ordered and renumbered by consecutive integers
– call them τi.
A Turing machine, which can examine another Turing machine by reviewing the
latter’s specifications on tape, cannot in general decide whether an arbitrary Turing
machine will complete its computation and halt on a given input, or go into an infinite
loop without ever printing any output. This assertion can be proven by contradiction.
Assume the existence of a machine algorithm that decides, in a finite number of steps,
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whether a given machine will halt on a given input. A machine δ can then be constructed
which, given an input integer n, operates as follows. δ initializes a counter j to 1, checks
to see whether τ1 halts on input 1, and if so increments j by 1. δ then checks to see
whether each subsequent machine τi halts on input j, in order, incrementing j for each
halting machine. When τi is determined not to halt, j remains at the same value and
the next machine τi+1 is checked. Finally, δ checks to see whether τn halts on input
j, where j now equals one plus the number of halting machines up through τn−1. If δ
decides that τn halts, then δ prints the jth digit computed by τn and then halts itself.
Otherwise, δ just halts. Note that, in the former case, as part of δ’s assigned task, δ
must effectively emulate machine τn. (Turing proved it is possible to design a machine
such as δ to emulate any other arbitrary machine τi on command.) By assumption, δ
can perform all of the above operations in a finite number of steps.
Since δ is essentially a machine that outputs a digit on being input an integer, δ
itself ranks among the τi machines described previously. Now give δ input k, such that
the kth halting machine is δ. δ will proceed by computing the first digit output from
the first halting machine, the first two digits output from the second halting machine,
and so forth, up to the first k − 1 digits output from the (k − 1)th halting machine. In
so doing, δ will have computed the first k − 1 digits of its own output sequence. Now
δ must compute the first k digits of the kth halting machine, itself. According to the
algorithm by which δ is defined, δ must recompute the first k − 1 digits of its output
sequence. Then to compute the kth digit, δ must recompute the first k − 1 digits of
its output sequence. And so forth, ad infinitum. We have arrived at a contradiction:
the assumption that δ will halt on all input implies that δ will not halt on at least one
input.
Alternatively, the unsolvability of the halting problem can be understood using
Cantor’s diagonal argument. If one attempts to enumerate all of the sequences computed
by halting machines, i.e. put them on a one-to-one correspondence with the integers,
one can always use a machine such as δ to construct a sequence not on the list - i.e.,
1− δ(j), if the output digits are binary digits. This would imply that the computable
sequences are uncountably infinite and, as there is at least one Turing machine for
each such sequence, that Turing machines are also uncountable. However, since Turing
machines are finitely specified, they must be countable: a contradiction, proving again
that the halting problem is unsolvable.
3. Semigroups and groups
A few definitions are in order. A semigroup is a set of elements for which a binary
operator has been defined so as to satisfy closure and associativity; equivalently, it
is a group in which elements are not required to have inverses. A finitely generated
semigroup or group, generally infinite, albeit discrete, and non-Abelian, has a finite
alphabet of generators. Its elements can be represented as “words”, i.e. strings “spelled
out” by products of generators. A finitely presented semigroup or group is specified
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by a finite number of generators and a finite number of relations, where relations are
equations between words. The word problem for semigroups or groups is the problem of
finding a general algorithm which, by successive application of the relations, can decide
whether two arbitrary words are equal (in a finite number of steps).
The following proof of the unsolvability of the semigroup word problem proceeds
very much like that of Post [12] but has been modified to connect it more directly with
the halting problem. Consider a semigroup Γτ with generators q0, q1, ...qh, s0, s1, ...sk,
and l. Each qi will represent a state of a Turing machine, each sj will represent a symbol
on the tape, s0 will represent a blank, and l will represent the left and right bounds of
the string of symbols input to the machine.
All of the operations of a Turing machine τ can then be represented by relations
in Γτ . The action of printing over symbol sb with symbol sd can be represented by the
following relation,
qasb = qcsd (1)
where a and c have some specific values between 1 and h, and likewise b and d between 0
and k. In accordance with Turing’s convention, all machine actions will be accompanied
by a simultaneous change of state. Similarly, the action of moving to the left one space
can be represented by the following h+ 2 relations.
siqasb = qcsisb, i = 0, 1, ..., h (2)
lqasb = lqcs0sb (3)
And the action of moving to the right one space can be represented by the following
h+ 2 relations.
qasbsi = sbqcsi, i = 0, 1, ..., h (4)
qasbl = sbqcs0l (5)
This completes the semigroup “emulation” of a Turing machine.
For the purpose of investigating the halting problem, I’m going to introduce two
new generators with the unconventional notation 〉 and 〈 , for reasons that will soon
become clear. For every qasb pair that does not appear in the left hand side of equations
(1-5), add the relation:
qasb =〉sb (6)
Now add the following 2h+ 3 relations:
si〉 =〉, i = 0, 1, ..., h (7)
l〉 = l〈 (8)
〈si = 〈, i = 0, 1, ..., h (9)
In effect, 〉 devours all symbols to its left. If it comes to the end-marker l, it mutates
into 〈 . 〈 devours all symbols to its right.
The outcome is that if any word ωι corresponds to an input ι on which the associated
Turing machine halts, then it can be shown to be equivalent, by repeated application of
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the above relations (7-9), to the word l〈l. If a word does not correspond to an input on
which the associated Turing machine halts, then it is not equivalent to the word l〈l. By
convention, q0 is reserved for the halting state, so the relation l〈l = q0 might be added
- then ωι = q0 in Γτ if and only if τ halts on input ι. An algorithm that could solve
the word problem for semigroups, therefore, could solve the halting problem for Turing
machines.
The above result for semigroups has direct implications for groups. For each finitely
presented semigroup Γτ described above, there is a prescription for constructing a
finitely presented group G′τ such that for every generator and relation in Γτ there is
a corresponding generator and relation in G′τ , and the following theorem holds: There
exist words uι and vι in the finitely presented group G
′
τ that are equal if and only if
ωι = q0 in the finitely presented semigroup Γτ [13]. Equivalently, wι ≡ uιv
−1
ι = 1 in
G′τ if and only if ωι = q0 in Γτ . Further, for each finitely presented group G
′
τ and each
word wι in G
′
τ there is a prescription for constructing a finitely presented group Gτ (wι)
such that for every generator and relation in G′τ there is a corresponding generator and
relation in Gτ (wι) and the following theorem holds: Gτ (wι) is trivial, i.e. contains only
the identity element, if and only if wι = 1 in G
′
τ [14]. It follows that the triviality of
finitely presented groups is algorithmically undecidable.
4. Manifolds
Each element of the fundamental group of a manifold represents an equivalence class of
closed paths in the manifold that can be continuously deformed into one another, i.e., a
homotopy class of closed paths. As an example, a trivial element in a fundamental
group represents a class of paths that can be contracted to a point, and a trivial
fundamental group implies a simply connected manifold. As another example, the
infinite cyclic group, which can be finitely presented by one generator and no relations,
is the fundamental group of a hypersphere with one arcwise connected handle: each
element of the group, equal to the generator raised to some power p, corresponds with
the homotopy class of paths that wind about the handle p times (and negative powers
will be said to correspond to counterwindings, described below). It will be shown that
for any given finitely presented group, a manifold can always be constructed for which
the given group is fundamental. The prescription can be summarized as attaching to
a hypersphere a handle for each generator of the group, followed by further surgery to
accommodate each relation.
The following construction is homeomorphic to that of Markov, but the method
of construction has been streamlined for pedagogical purposes. Consider an arbitrary
finitely presented group of the form
G = {g1, ..., gm|r1, ..., rn} (10)
where each ri is a word representing a relation of the form ri = 1 and is called a
relator. Beginning with the 4-sphere, S4, for each generator gi attach a handle of the
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form Hi = S
3 × [−1,+1]. Each such attachment is performed by removing from S4
two non-intersecting, open 4-balls and identifying the resulting 3-spherical boundaries
with the ends of Hi. Calling the former S
4 region A, the attachments are subject to the
conditions that no two handles intersect, and the intersection of each handle with A is
a union of two 3-spheres: Hi ∩Hj = 0, i 6= j, A ∩Hi = S
3 × {−1,+1}. In this manner
a manifold can be handily constructed for each free fundamental group of the form
{g1, ..., gn|}. To understand this, note that the construction thus far is homeomorphic
to the connected sum of m copies of S3 × S1, then use the fact that the fundamental
group of the cross product of manifolds is the free product of the fundamental groups
of the manifolds, while the fundamental group of the connected sum of manifolds is the
direct product of the fundamental groups of the manifolds.
An arbitrary word can be represented by a closed path in the above construction
as follows. Consider a path that begins at some point inside A. Reading the word from
left to right, represent each generator gi of positive power p by a path that enters its
associated handle Hi at S
2 × {−1} , then exits Hi at S
2 × {+1} , then circles back
around and repeats p−1 times. Represent negative powers −p the same way but switch
S2 × {−1} and S2 × {+1} (hence negative powers “unwind” positive powers). After
exiting the handle for the pth time, continue the path to the handle associated with the
next generator in the word, and repeat the winding process, continuing in this way until
the last generator in the word has been represented. Finally, join the end of the path
with its starting point to close the loop.
A relator of the finitely presented fundamental group, being a word equated with the
identity, corresponds to paths that can be continuously deformed to a point. Obviously
such deformation of a path through a handle is obstructed; some topological surgery
will be necessary to bypass the obstruction. For each relator rj , gouge out a region
from the above constructed manifold (call the manifold M) along the vicinity of a path
representative of rj such that the gouged-out region is homeomorphic to U
3×S2 , where
U3 is the open 3-ball. Simultaneously, in a copy of S4 , gouge out a similar U3 × S1
region; call this manifold Oj. Finally, identify the S
2 × S1 boundary of the gouged-out
region inM (call this boundary Tj ) with the S
2×S1 boundary of the gouged-out region
in Oj. Note that Oj is simply connected. (To see this, consider that the only conceivably
non-trivial closed path in Oj is one that interlocks with the loop formed by the gouged-
out region. But the former can be continuously deformed to the boundary of the latter,
whereupon it can be made to encircle a cross-section homeomorphic to S2, and thereon
contracted to a point.) Any path in the homotopy class of paths associated with the
relator rj can now be continuously deformed to the surface of Tj , then contracted to a
point in Oj . Repeat this surgery for each relator, in this way gluing to M , n copies of
Oj. This completes the construction. It can be verified, by considering the fundamental
groups of the subspaces that cover M [15], that the fundamental group ofM is the given
group G as advertised.
If two manifolds are homeomorphic, their fundamental groups are isomorphic. But
the converse is not necessarily true, thus the non-classifiability of the manifolds does not
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immediately follow from the non-classifiability of their fundamental groups. Fortunately
for the purposes of this proof, the manifolds constructed above have the following critical
property. First consider another manifold formed by gouging out from S4, m non-
intersecting regions homeomorphic to U3 × S1, and gluing the remaining boundaries to
those of an identical copy; call the resulting manifold Nm. Given one of the previously
constructed manifolds M such that its fundamental group G has m generators, if G is
trivial then, it turns out, M must be homeomorphic to Nm [1].
To come full circle, let the fundamental group of the manifoldM represent a Turing
machine: let M = Mτ (wι) such that its fundamental group is Gτ (wι) , as described in
Section 2. Call Mτ (wι) a Turing manifold. Call Nm(τ,ι), where m(τ, ι) is the number of
generators required to represent the Turing machine τ with input ι by Gτ (wι), a halting
manifold. It follows that the Turing manifold Mτ (wι) is homeomorphic to the halting
manifold Nm(τ,ι) if and only if Turing machine τ halts on input ι .
5. Discussion
A sketch of a proof has been given for the non-classifiability of the 4-manifolds, by
way of a topological construction whereby a 4-manifold represents a Turing machine.
More precisely, a Turing machine has been encoded into a finitely presented semigroup,
which has been encoded into a finitely presented group, which along with a particular
Turing input has been encoded into another finitely presented group, which has been
encoded into a 4-manifold. The chain of encodings is such that solving the homeomorphy
problem for 4-manifolds would solve the halting problem for Turing machines, which is
unsolvable. Expressed more intuitively, the essence of the problem is that the topology
of a 4-manifold is potentially so rich that its complexity can rival that of any computer
program intended to analyze it. Inputting the specifications of a 4-manifold to such a
computer program can, in a sense, be equivocated with inputting a computer program
to a computer program – an enterprise subject to logical paradoxes and limitations of
the kind brought to light by Turing.
Regarding the physical applicability of Markov’s theorem, while the constructions
considered above are compact 4-manifolds, spacetime is often considered to be non-
compact, and is sometimes speculated to have hidden extra dimensions. Markov’s proof
applies equally well to higher dimensional manifolds - consider M × Sd−4, where d > 4
- as well as non-compact manifolds - consider M#R4. Granted Markov’s theorem only
applies to manifolds that are permitted to be non-simply connected, but there is a strong
possibility that the universe lives in this category. On the cosmic scale, the universe may
be multiply-connected [2]; on the stellar scale, black hole interiors may be topologically
nontrivial, though such nontriviality might be rendered undetectable by event horizons
[16] (on the other hand, traversable worm holes might exist [17]); on the subatomic
scale, particles are sometimes speculated to be topological geons [18, 19]; and on the
Planck scale, spacetime foam is conjectured to perturb the local topology to no end
[7, 8, 9, 20].
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It is conceivable that some physical criteria could be found which would restrict
permissible 4-manifolds to classifiable manifolds. For example, if a strict interpretation
of causality is imposed, in the form of the conditions of isochrony and the exclusion of
closed timelike curves, then it can be shown that the allowed 4-manifolds are constrained
to those of the form C×[0, 1], C×[0,∞), and C×(−∞,∞), where C is a 3-manifold [21].
These manifolds are classifiable if the 3-manifolds are classifiable; although whether the
3-manifolds are classifiable is still an open question. Note that the proof of Markov’s
theorem, as sketched above, is not applicable to 3-manifolds; for example, the three-
dimensional analog of Oj is not simply connected, as required. In a sense, there is
not enough “room” in a 3-manifold to topologically encode a Turing machine, and
so there is hope that 3-manifolds might be classifiable. However, whether the universe
obeys the previously mentioned interpretation of causality is unknown. These particular
conditions may be too restrictive; they would preclude Wheeler’s spacetime foam, as
well as other exotic but physically motivated topological proposals. In summary, on the
basis of current physical knowledge, the non-classifiability of the 4-manifolds remains
relevant.
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